Historical Thinking in Intercultural Perspective: Iranian Narratives on the Mongol Era by Pistor-Hatam, Anja
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #03–2014
This paper will apply Jörn Rüsen’s „inter-
cultural comparison of historical think-
ing“ to modern Iranian historiography 
on the Mongol period (C13th-14th). In 
order to appreciate the differences in 
the historical narratives under examina-
tion, Jan Assmann’s „history of mean-
ing“ with its „fictions of coherence“ shall 
be referred to. As the analysis of modern 
Iranian historiography on the Mongol 
era demonstrates, it is only under the as-
sumption that these historical narratives 
are to be understood in the context of a 
relativistic history of meaning that it is at 
all possible to accept large parts of their 
content as plausible.
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“Intercultural Comparison of Historical 
Thinking”
Regarding historiography in an interna-
tional perspective, how can we compare 
various national historiographies without 
falling into the trap of Eurocentrism? Ac-
cording to Chakrabarty, “Europe works as 
a silent referent in historical knowledge” 
(2). Its dominance “as the subject of all his-
tories” is still part of the “theoretical con-
dition under which historical knowledge 
is produced” (2). Bearing this in mind, we 
may however search for universals in his-
torical thinking shared by societies in var-
ious parts of the world that possess differ-
ent concepts of time and meaning. In 
order to be able to compare these various 
types of historical thinking, one has to ac-
cept their dissimilarities. Yet, at the same 
time, one also has to relieve them from 
the dichotomy of “self” and “other,” and 
from related positive and negative attri-
butions (Rüsen 16).2 
German historian Jörn Rüsen proposes a 
theoretical approach that relates to an “in-
tercultural comparison of historical think-
ing.” According to Rüsen, there is no ex-
clusive and universally accepted historical 
interpretation of historical facts, because 
these same facts are located in different 
perspectives. Consequently, a perspec-
tive-based character of historical narrative 
and a diversity of historical thinking must 
be accepted as given (27, 32). To make 
room for different perspectives on histor-
ical circumstances, a “universal category 
of equality” would have to be a prerequi-
site. This “universal category of equality” 
includes the assumption of “equality in 
the use of reason to establish the plausi-
bility of histories” accompanied by the 
“principle of the reciprocal appreciation 
of differences” (29).
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In this paper, I will use the case study of 
modern Iranian historiography on the 
Mongol period to apply Rüsen’s “intercul-
tural comparison of historical thinking.” 
These historical narratives were published 
in Iran from the 1930s until 2011. Mostly, 
they were written and published as text-
books to be taught at schools and univer-
sities, where they continue to imprint pub-
lic historical consciousness. In order to 
appreciate differences in the historical 
narratives under examination, I will refer to 
Jan Assman’s “history of meaning” 
(“Sinngeschichte”): What is the meaning 
bestowed on the Mongol era by modern 
historical narratives written in Iran? How 
are fictions of coherence constructed to 
shape meaning in the historical events of 
the epoch? As the analysis of modern Ira-
nian historiography on the Mongol era 
demonstrates, it is only under the assump-
tion that these historical narratives are to 
be understood in the context of a relativ-
istic history of meaning that it is at all pos-
sible to accept large parts of their content 
as plausible.
The Emergence of Modern Iranian Histo-
riography
The first Mongol invasion into Muslim 
lands took place between 1219 and 1224. 
When Genghis Khan went back to Mon-
golia, he left governors behind to rule the 
conquered territories in his name. About 
thirty years later, his grandson Hülegü un-
dertook another campaign to defeat the 
remaining enemies of the Mongols on the 
Iranian plateau and in Mesopotamia. In 
this campaign, the Ismaʿilis were crushed, 
Baghdad was conquered, and the Abbas-
id caliph killed. Although the first Mongol 
invasion had already been disastrous for 
the affected regions, erasure of the Ab-
basid caliphate by “unbelievers” was per-
ceived as a disaster by many Muslim con-
temporaries and later commentators. 
Hülegü and his successors established 
themselves in Iran (roughly the region 
from Herat to the Euphrates) as the Ilkhan-
ids (1258-1335). They not only rebuilt their 
ruined territories, but also integrated 
them into the vast Mongolian empire, 
with its strong focus on long-distance 
trade. The Ilkhanid government was the 
first to be closely associated with the Ira-
nian plateau since the time of the Sassa-
nians (224-651). And although historiog-
raphy had already been written in the 
Persian language during the rule of the 
Buyids (945-1055), it was only at that point 
that Persian historiography truly flour-
ished (Melville, “Historiography”). Rashid 
al-Din Fazlollah (ca. 1247-1318) and ʿAta 
Malek Jovayni (1226-83) rank among the 
most influential historians of their time. 
Their historiographical works are still con-
sulted as important sources on the Mon-
gol era in Iran. 
Modern Iranian historical thinking as well 
as its historiography were deeply influ-
enced by European concepts since about 
the middle of the 19th century. As Ansari 
has pointed out in his recently published 
book on Iranian nationalism, Iranian mem-
ories and historical narratives were in that 
era replaced by a European metanarra-
tive. Histories provided by Iranians “were 
relegated to the realm of literature, re-
deemed only by their artistic and aesthet-
ic qualities.” They had to be substituted by 
“facts” (17). However, only a few intellectu-
als were able to implement these new 
standards, which led to a “simplification of 
the intellectual corpus into digestible 
morsels which often bore little relation to 
the complex realities of intellectual life in 
the West” (29).
During the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi 
(1925-41), historiography became a part of 
nation-building. Although traces of proto-
nationalist historiography could already 
be detected in the late 19th century (Am-
anat, “Legend” 292-93), it was only in the 
1930s that an official historiographical 
project was begun. By means of a state-
sponsored official historiography, “nation-
al history” from the Achaemenids (558-
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #03–2014
FoCUs 106
330 BC) to the Pahlavis (1925-79) came 
into being (Amanat, “Historiography”). As 
part of the ideological framework, “the 
idea that the Iranian ‘nation’ in its com-
bined geographical and political sense 
emerged during the Achaemenid period” 
was adopted (Ashraf). Alessandro Bausani 
referred to this concept in establishing 
what he called “Aryan and Neo-Achaeme-
nid nationalism” (ibid.).
During most of the Pahlavi era, a lack of 
political freedom and the impossibility to 
write critical or even balanced historical 
or political treatises resulted in the re-
serve of historians. Additionally, the use of 
history for politically motivated contor-
tions and embellishments entailed frus-
tration on the part of historians as well as 
the public (Azimi 428). Analytical and in-
dependent critical thinking was not en-
couraged in the humanities. Instead, a 
quasi-textual positivism, in “learning by 
rote and unquestioning deference to el-
ders” were cultivated (429).
Although some professional historians fa-
miliar with European concepts of histori-
ography got to work in Reza Shah’s time, 
they were not successful in completely or 
in some cases even mainly replacing spe-
cialists for literary studies and other en-
thusiasts in providing textbooks for 
schools and universities to this day. Yet, 
professional historians or not, they were 
all under the influence of the official na-
tionalist discourse, and convinced that 
“Iran” had existed as a cultural entity since 
Achaemenid times.
Even before the Iranian government de-
cided that a national history had to be 
written, three of the founders of modern 
Iranian historiography–literary historian 
ʿAbbas Eqbal (1897-1956), political think-
er and politician Hasan Pirniya (1872-
1935), and journalist, publicist and politi-
cian Sayyed Hasan Taqizadeh 
(1878-1970)–met in Paris in order to plan 
for such an endeavour. Eqbal and Pirniya 
later counted among the illustrious au-
thors who contributed to this multi-vol-
ume national history. Whereas Pirniya was 
responsible for ancient Iran, Eqbal dealt 
with the period from the Mongols to the 
Qajars (1779-1925) (Andisheh 139; Vejda-
ni 310-11, 330-32). Even though ʿAbbas 
Eqbal was not a trained historian, he was 
the first scholar to concern himself with 
the Mongol era as part of an Iranian na-
tional history. In doing this, he laid an im-
portant cornerstone of modern historiog-
raphy in Iran.
Furthermore, beginning in 1924, a large 
number of European–including Russian–
publications on Iranian history were 
translated into Persian (Azimi 424). In 
this way, even those writers of historical 
narratives who had no knowledge of Eu-
ropean languages were able to acquire 
insight into European or American schol-
arship on Iran. Until this day, well-known 
authors of the early 20th century to the 
late 1970s are quoted by those writing 
about the history of the Mongol era in 
Iran. Their interpretation of this historical 
epoch still influences Iranian historiogra-
phy. However, it appears that this at-
tempt at providing a Persian-speaking 
public with international, state-of-the-art 
historical writing has been considerably 
reduced since 1979. At least as regards 
historiography of the Mongol era, hardly 
any publications that have appeared 
outside Iran after the revolution are 
quoted in Persian historical narratives 
under review.
Returning to the Pahlavi era, it is impor-
tant to note that apart from the official na-
tionalist discourse that influenced the 
writing of national history, a number of 
counter-discourses also existed. Nearly 
all Iranian intellectuals who participated 
in these various nationalist discourses, be 
they laypersons or clerics, had one thing 
in common: They all believed in “the 
primordialist nature of Iran as a twenty-
five-hundred-year old nation” (Aghaie, 
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“Nationalist Historiography” 25). Yet, they 
disagreed on questions of Iran’s “relation-
ship to the West, the nature of its govern-
ment and leadership,” and, of course, 
“the role of religion vs. secularism in 
shaping Iran’s national identity” (ibid.).
Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, con-
cern with historical matters has apparently 
increased. Yet, historiography is still dom-
inated by enthusiasts who are mainly inter-
ested in reviewing documents instead of 
critical study and contemporary research 
(Amanat, “Study of History” 6). Even 
though we may interpret mere publication 
of documents as a strategy to avoid po-
litical controversy (Aghaie, “Islamist Histo-
riography” 235, 259-62), the fact remains 
that methodologically and analytically sat-
isfying studies are scarce. Typical of what 
Aghaie calls “Islamist Historiography” is its 
condemnation of 19th- and early 20th-cen-
tury orientalism. Additionally, Islamist his-
toriography characteristically accentuates 
the importance of Islam in Iranian history, 
divine predestination, and the central role 
Shiite scholars (ʿolamaʾ) allegedly played 
in political incidents (234). Simultaneously, 
historians of different convictions and ap-
proaches also write historical narratives. In 
addition, those scholars who were active 
during the Pahlavi era are either still work-
ing, or at the least, their publications from 
this period are still consulted. Overall, we 
can conclude that Iranian historiography 
until this day continues to be strongly de-
termined by the placement of historical 
consciousness in a literary tradition of 
myths and legends, as well as the ideo-
logically dominated narratives of various 
political currents.
Iranian National Historiography and the 
Mongols
In undertaking an “intercultural compari-
son of historical thinking,” we have to fo-
cus on cultural as well as socio-political 
contexts of historiography. Regarding our 
case study, this includes, inter alia, how Ira-
nian historians are situated in respective 
systems of government and rule. As re-
gards the situation of these authors, 
ʿAbbas Eqbal may be considered to have 
been a part of the system. He was, after all, 
asked by the Reza Shah government to 
write part of the envisioned Iranian nation-
al history. With this survey work, which was 
supposed to reconstruct Iranian history 
“from the beginnings to the present,” a 
distinct “Iran-time”–that is, the creation of 
a unique time frame connecting “glorious” 
pre-Islamic Iran with an awakened present 
and a rejuvenated future (Tavakoli-Targhi 
97)–was established that served to legiti-
mize the rule of the Pahlavi shah. Although 
nationalism was one of the most important 
subjects in his life and work, Eqbal had 
managed to keep his distance and not be-
come part of the socio-political elite of his 
time (Azimi 381-83). In the same way as 
Eqbal, the literary historian Abd al-Hoseyn 
Zarrinkub (1923-99) argued the cause of 
nationalism, and supported the official na-
tionalist discourse under Mohammad 
Reza Shah.
In the Islamic Republic, essential compo-
nents of these nationalist ideas have been 
preserved. Therefore, those authors who 
argue for these ideas do not necessarily 
oppose the current regime. On the con-
trary, as in the case with the historian Shirin 
Bayani (b. 1938), her reasoning aligns very 
well with the present official ideology that 
emphasizes the correlation between Shi-
ite Islam and Iranian nationalism. Accord-
ingly, the ruling elite of the Islamic Repub-
lic is legitimized insofar as the narrative of 
Iran’s ultimate liberation from any kind of 
foreign rule, as well as the final victory of 
Shiite Islam, are approved to have been 
procured by the revolution of 1979. 
Turning back to Rüsen’s “intercultural 
comparison of historical thinking,” it is 
important to note his assumption that 
there exists “consistency in the use of 
reason.” According to Rüsen, this consis-
tency is essential for the plausibility of 
historical narratives, and has to involve 
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the “principle of mutual recognition of 
dissimilarities” (Rüsen, “Einleitung” 29). 
As regards modern Iranian historical nar-
ratives about the Mongol period, these 
are largely affected by reinterpretations 
and fictions of coherence. These reinter-
pretations and fictions of coherence 
have for their part to be ascribed to so-
cio-political conditions and associated 
nationalist and religious ideologies, re-
spectively. Consequently, on closer ex-
amination they often lack plausibility and 
do not comply with scholarly standards 
like verifiability, rationality, and reflection 
of the individual scholar’s own viewpoint. 
It is only under the assumption that these 
historical narratives are to be understood 
in the context of a relativistic history of 
meaning that it is at all possible to accept 
large parts of their content as plausible. 
Instead of deconstructing perceived fic-
tions of coherence, a relativistic history of 
meaning simply recognizes them as 
plausible. We also have to consider that 
history itself is the produce of a culture 
or society within its own semantic para-
digms (Assmann vii, 13). A relativist ap-
proach to the history of meaning may be 
compensated for insofar as the historical 
narratives point to a diversity of historical 
thinking in inter- as well as in intra-cultur-
al perspectives. In this way, the polypho-
ny and contingency of historical actions 
cannot be suppressed by a monophonic 
narrative.
Now, what exactly are these fictions of co-
herence that can be found in historical 
narratives on the Mongol era? And, in 
which way has this era’s history been rein-
terpreted? A few examples follow, which 
will be subsequently analyzed:
In order to transform defeat into victory, 
the narrative of the Iranian phoenix persis-
tently rising from the ashes is used to rein-
terpret history: helped by their superior 
(Islamic-) Iranian culture and civilization, 
Iranians overcame the Mongols and 
tamed the Mongolian dragon. 
According to a frequently repeated narra-
tive, the Mongol conquest of Baghdad 
and the fall of the Abbasid caliph are 
transformed from an irritation brought 
about by a historic breach or rupture for 
contemporary Iranians and Shiites into a 
long-desired and hailed affair, comprising 
the liberation from the Abbasid-Arab-Sun-
nite yoke.
By reinterpreting history in relation to 
Ghazan Khan’s (gov 1295-1304) conversion 
to Islam, the Mongol enemy is seen as for-
ever subdued; conquered and conquer-
ors exchange places, the Islamic-Iranian 
element prevails, and Shiite Islam be-
comes the predominant religion in Iran. 
This fiction of coherence marks the begin-
ning of a new era, equivalent to the victory 
of the “Iranian element,” the triumph of the 
Shia, and the reestablishment of an Iranian 
nation-state.
According to a primordial nationalist as-
sumption, a nucleus of “Iranianness” is ul-
timately simply indestructible.
With the purpose of transforming defeat 
into victory, it is essential to confront the 
brutality of the Mongol conquests with a 
spiritual and moral elevation on the part of 
the defeated Iranians. In light of the oft-
described decadence and symptoms of 
decline in Iranian society on the eve of the 
first Mongol invasion, this becomes a dif-
ficult task. Nonetheless, most authors try 
to emphasize the mental superiority of 
“Iranianness” based on cultural heritage.3 
As maintained by these modern writers: 
At the end of the day, the people who are 
culturally more powerful will prevail. Iran, 
which is said to have been Islamized by 
the pen rather than the sword, had always 
fought a war of the pen and emerged vic-
torious (Eqbal 81-82; Hajj Sayyed Javadi 
395-97; Alborz 84-87; Dadfar 81-82; 
Qad yani 11-12; Kasayi 986-88; Bayani, Vol. 
2 383).
More than anybody else, Shirin Bayani has 
provided a reinterpretation of the Mongol 
era. Her fiction of coherence integrates 
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well into the political landscape of the Is-
lamic Republic: That is to say, Bayani at-
tributes a fundamental significance to Shi-
ite Islam as a substantial element of Iranian 
identity, and to the Shiites as champions 
of Iran’s independence. Since she cannot 
prove the alleged Shiite resistance to the 
Mongols, Bayani not very convincingly ar-
gues that their prevalence is due to dis-
simulation (taqiyyeh) and to the fact that 
the majority of 13th- and 14th-century his-
torians had been Sunnites (Bayani, Vol. 1 
304-05; Vol. 2 571). She places Nasir al-Din 
Tusi (d. 1274) in the center of this fiction of 
coherence on the Shiite battle for Iranian 
independence. Bayani is convinced of this 
famous scholar’s religious as well as po-
litical obligation to help overthrow the Ab-
basids when the time had come (Vol. 1 
305-09). Bayani is joined in her appraisal 
of Nasir al-Din Tusi by other authors who 
also see in him a personification of the Ira-
nians’ political presence and their national 
consciousness (Kasayi 988; Jaʿfariyan 52).
Shiite Islam relies on the martyrdom of 
prophet Muhammad’s grandson al-
Hoseyn, who was killed in the battle of 
Karbala in 680, according to its origin 
myth. Referring to the significance of mar-
tyrdom, Bayani emphasizes the crucial 
commitment of Shiites who fought against 
the Abbasids and the Mongols, using 
martyrdom as a means to reach their aim 
(Vol. 2 571). Again, Iranians–this time as 
Shiites–are described as sufferers, as vic-
tims of arbitrariness and oppression, who 
can only fall back upon the war of the pen, 
their secret struggle, and their willingness 
to give their lives for the common cause. 
In this ongoing “clash of cultures” evoked 
by Bayani in one of her books, Iranians 
used religion and administration to fight 
the Mongols. Islam, mainly Shiite Islam, 
was brought into play against the Mongol 
code of law (yasa), and the “Iranian ele-
ment” in the end succeeded in destroying 
and absorbing the “foreign elements” 
(367-69). For Bayani, like for other au-
thors, the final point of assimilation was 
reached when Ghazan Khan converted to 
Islam. Through his conversion, the enemy 
was forever subdued; conquered and 
conquerors traded places, the Islamic-Ira-
nian principle prevailed, and Shiite Islam 
became the predominant religion in Iran, 
thus initializing its religious indepen-
dence (435-36). Ghazan Khan, it is said, 
was one of the greatest rulers of the Ori-
ent and Iran; apart from being Muslim, he 
was also an Iranian ruler, thus transform-
ing the Ilkhanid into an Iranian reign (466, 
471; Mortazavi 89, 173; Montazer al-Qaʿem 
1, 255). This fiction of coherence on the 
Islamization and Iranization of the Ilkhanid 
ruler (who additionally ended a period of 
humiliation and initiated a new era in Ira-
nian history) is supported by contempo-
rary narrative sources like Rashid al-Din’s 
famous universal history “Collector of 
Chronicles” (Jameʾ al-tavarikh) (Melville, 
“History and Myth” 140). According to 
Melville, some verse-chronicles describe 
the rule of the Ilkhanids in the style of the 
Shahnameh, yet “another cycle of Iranian 
kingship, brought to a peak with the reign 
of the philosopher king and just ruler, 
Ghazan Khan” (142). There obviously is a 
great similarity of myth and history con-
tained in these narratives. In the context 
of the construction of meaning, this new 
era becomes equivalent with the victory 
of the “Iranian element,” the triumph of 
Shia, and the reestablishment of an Irani-
an nation-state.
Conclusion
As part of my conclusion, Rüsen’s already 
mentioned “principle of mutual recogni-
tion of dissimilarities” should be read-
dressed. This principle would imply that 
scholars in Iran and abroad had been re-
ciprocally aware of each other’s publica-
tions. However, in the case of the historical 
narratives discussed here, this does not 
seem to be the case. As already stated, 
hardly any publications on the Mongol era 
printed in European languages after 1979 
were included in the texts analyzed here. 
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More precisely, Iranian authors writing 
about this period do not give attention to 
the state of the art in international aca-
demic research. It is difficult to determine 
to what extent scholars working on the 
Mongol period abroad, for their part, are 
observing how that is being done in Iran. 
For the present, it can only be stated that 
concerning the relevant references stud-
ied, one hardly comes across any allusion 
to related Persian publications. Regard-
less, the pre-1979 impact of “Western” 
(and Russian) scholarly literature concern-
ing the Mongol period on the construc-
tion of meaning by Iranian authors re-
mains considerable.
As stated above, the fictions of coherence 
included in the historical narratives ana-
lyzed in this study serve as constructions 
of identity and self-assurance. Therefore, 
they cannot be defined simply as “fabrica-
tions.” On the contrary, they have to be 
recognized as constructions that give 
meaning to often contingent historical 
events. Questions of governmental legiti-
macy become involved in this context, as 
do standards of truth that are conveyed by 
historical narratives. Closely linked to self-
awareness is the established collective 
memory that not least builds on fictions of 
coherence like the permanent victimiza-
tion of Iran. If nothing else, these fictions 
of coherence are consolidated by modern 
historical narratives on the Mongol era in 
Iran and maintain significant bearing on 
political thinking and action in the country. 
Modern Iranian authors studying Mongol 
history in Iran are assigned the task of giv-
ing meaning to this history. They must in-
tegrate this particular era into the “linear 
time of the nation“ (Özkirimli 209) and 
comply with requirements of society re-
garding the construction of meaning. In 
this regard, their outlook on Mongol his-
tory in many respects clashes with today’s 
international academic standards. 
The extent to which outcome of these his-
torical narratives is accepted as plausible 
depends not least on the respective aca-
demic paradigms. Until the 1970s, the en-
tanglements of historical narratives written 
in Iran and abroad were relatively firm. Af-
terwards, however, a more sophisticated 
approach–tightly linked to the standards 
of historical science in general–eventually 
became widely accepted among interna-
tional historians of the Mongol period. 
This approach additionally changed the 
way these historians perceived their sourc-
es. Historians then began to make allow-
ances for their narrative character. Histori-
ans of the Mongol period also became 
aware of the fact that they themselves de-
pended on observation theories of con-
temporary historians. But the Iranian au-
thors cited here have not joined in with 
these new paradigms. Therefore, this 
“principle of mutual recognition” has only 
rarely been applied in the past thirty years. 
As a result, Iranian historical narratives 
may represent alternative interpretations 
of history, which decode the same facts 
from various perspectives. However, these 
narratives can for the most part only be 
accepted as plausible if one reads them as 
contributions toward a history of meaning 
that leaves room for fictions of coherence, 
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